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It seems to me that in the stage of industrial development now existing
it must be accepted that legislation to achieve industrial peace and to
provide a forum for the quick determination of labour-management
disputes is legislation in the public interest, beneficial to employee and
employer.18
Surely there must be a case where, because of judicial review by




The Queen in the Right of the Province of Ontario v. Jennings (1966),
57 D.L.R. (2d) 644. Supreme Court of Canada.
DAMAGES--PERSONAL INJURIES-LOSS OF EARNINGS-DEDUCTION OF
INCOME TAXES IN MEASURING COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURIES.
Claims for damages for personal injuries are a common occurrence
in modern litigation and often part of the claim is for loss of earnings,
past and prospective. Assessing the damages is a difficult task, both
for the court deciding the matter, and for counsel attempting to nego-
tiate a settlement. One of the most contentious issues involved in cal-
culating the award for loss of future earnings is whether the fact that
the plaintiff would have been liable for income tax, had he received the
income normally, should be taken into account to reduce the damages.
Because of its importance for everyday practice, the recent decision
in The Queen in the Right of the Province of Ontario v. Jennings,'
in which the Supreme Court of Canada finally decided the issue, is
extremely significant. The decision is noteworthy for another reason
as well. In deciding to ignore the incidence of tax, the court rejected
the decision of the House of Lords in British Transportation Commis-
sion v. Gourley2 where the damages awarded were an amount reduced
by the plaintiff's tax liability.3
The plaintiff, Jennings, fifty years of age, was a successful vice-
president of a large manufacturing concern. He was so severely injured
in an automobile accident caused by the defendants' negligence that
from the time of the accident he remained unconscious. His life ex-
pectancy was reduced from twenty-two to five years and those remain-
ing years would likely be spent in hospital. The trial judge, Ferguson,
18 [1966] S.C.R. at 292, 56 D.L.R. (2d) at 201. (Italics mine.)
* D. E. Franks, B.A. (McMaster) is a member of the 1967 graduating
class at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1966), 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644, (affirming) [1965] 2 O.R. 285; (1965), 50
D.L.R. (2d) 385.
2 [1956] A.C. 185.
3 The express rejection of the House of Lords decision by the Supreme
Court of Canada may indicate the beginning of an important trend in Cana-
dian jurisprudence. For a comment on this aspect of the Jennings case see
Bale, G., (1966), 44 CAN. BAR REV. 724, 726.
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J., awarded the plaintiff $146,000 in damages, and in assessing the
portion of the damages for loss of future earnings he followed the
Gourley decision and dedhcted a sum for the income tax that Jennings
would have had to pay had he earned the income. The majority of the
Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal and increased
the total award to $180,000.4 Their decision was based, not on a
rejection of the Gourley principle, but on the fact that a proper
foundation had not been laid for its application in this case.5
The Crown appealed this decision and the Supreme Court of
Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal. The important comments
with respect to the tax issue are to be found in the judgment of
Judson, J.6 He felt that since the non-taxability of damages had not
yet been established in Canada in litigation involving revenue authori-
ties, there was no basis on which to apply Gourley. However, he bases
his decision on much broader grounds and expressly rejects the
principle in the Gourley case. In effect, he holds that whether or not
the award for loss of future earnings is taxable in the recipient's hands,
the plaintiff's tax liability should not be taken into account in assess-
ing the damages. His reasons can be divided into three categories.
The plaintiff is being compensated not for loss of future earnings,
but for loss of earning capacity, i.e. a capital asset is being replaced
and in Canada capital is not taxed. The value of this capital asset is
the present value of the future income that it would have generated,
and this income is less all expenses which would be incurred to earn
it. However, income tax is not a cost of earning income but merely a
compulsory disposition of part of the funds and should no more be
considered than any other use which the plaintiff would have made
of his funds. This argument is in agreement with one of the minority
views in the Seventh Report of the Law Reform Committee in Eng-
land.7 It has a great deal of merit and will be discussed in greater
detail below.
The second reason contains two related points. The first is an
answer to the submission that if tax is ignored, the plaintiff will be
overcompensated. Judson, J. says that the computation of the lump
sum involves so many contingencies and uncertainties that mathemat-
ical precision is impossible. A seriously disabled plaintiff would usually
prefer his earning capacity unimpaired, or the effect of impairment
4 [1965] 2 O.R. 285; (1965) 50 D.L.R. (2d) 385. Only part of the increase
was because of the tax issue.
5 The Gourley case was decided on the basis of an agreement by counsel
that the damages would not be taxable in the hands of the plaintiff. However,
in Jennings there was no such agreement and therefore Kelly, J.A. at p. 419,
put the onus on the defendant to show that the non-taxability of damages has
been authoritatively decided in proceedings involving the Minister of National
Revenue. He also put the onus on the defendant to adduce satisfactory evi-
dence as to the plaintiff's taxable income and other financial circumstances
which might be relevant. Since the defendant had not satisfactorily discharged
these burdens there was no basis for applying the rule in Gourley's case.
6 (1966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 644, 654.
7 The 7th Report of the Law Reform Committee, Cmnd. 501 in England
with respect to the issue in Gourley's case. The report was made to Parliament
in August 1958.
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periodically reassessed, than the receipt of the lump sum, so that the
amount of the award is a guess that is nearly always to the plaintiff's
detriment. It would be grossly unfair to add another uncertainty, the
future incidence of tax on the plaintiff's income, and thereby increase
the detriment.
Also, if no tax is levied on the plaintiff's award by the Department
of Revenue, it would not be fair to allow the defendant to complain
about this aspect of tax policy and reap the benefit for himself or his
insurance company.
Finally, it was held that the application of the Gourley principle
leads to many difficulties in practice. In litigation, the evidence with
respect to the damages claimed usually involves a trial within the
main trial establishing liability. Evidence with respect to the incidence
of tax will, in effect, be a third trial and make the litigation even
more cumbersome and costly. Further, Judson, J. notes many prob-
lems in determining the base on which the tax will be computed, e.g.
possibilities of marriage, children, or tax planning to reduce future




Today we have a situation in which the House of Lords in Eng-
land and the Supreme Court of Canada have taken diametrically
opposite positions on the same issue. Before we discuss the merits of
each viewpoint and compare and contrast their effects, let us note
the development of the relevant law on the problem.
Before Gourley, the law in England was the same as it now is
in Canada following the Jennings decision; that is, tax liability was
ignored in assessing damages for loss of future earnings.9 These de-
cisions were based on two Latin maxims: restitutio in integrum-
the plaintiff should be put in the same position that he would have
been in but for the wrong, i.e. receipt of his fees in full; and res inter
alios acta, any tax liability would be a matter between the plaintiff
8 For a comprehensive analysis of these practical difficulties of the
Gourley decision, see Kmnx AND KEMP, tna QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN PERSONAL
INiuRy CASES, (2nd edition), (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1961), Vol. 1,
Appendix E at p. 717.
9 The question of including liability for income tax in assessing damages
for loss of future earnings first arose in England in Fairholme v. Firth and
Brown Ltd., (1933) 49 T.L.R. 470, which involved a breach of contract. Parcq,
J., held that the damages could not be reduced by the income tax the plaintiff
would have paid had he earned the income. Lord Sorn, in a Scottish personal
injury case, M'Daid v. Clyde Navigation Trustees, [1946] S.C. 462; [1946]
S.L.T. 127, reached the opposite conclusion and assessed damages on the basis
of net income after tax. However, this conclusion was challenged by Lord
Keith in another Scottish case, Blackwood v. Andre, [1947] S.C. 333. Jordan
v. The Limmer and Trinidad Lake Asphalt Co. Ltd., [1946] K.B. 356; [1946]
1 All E.R. 527, an English case decided shortly after M'Daid, did not follow
nor even mention it but followed the principle in Fairholme v. Firtb and
Brown Ltd. The problem was first presented to the English Court of Appeal
in Biflingham 'v. Hughes, [1949] 1 K.B. 643, [1949] 1 All E.R. 684, (personal
injuries case) and the court, after reviewing the authorities, unanimously
decided to ignore the incidence of income tax.
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and the Crown.10 In Ontario prior to 1956, there were only three re-
ported cases" which dealt with this issue and all of them excluded tax
consideration on the basis of the res inter alios acta arguments of the
English cases.
Britisk Transportation Commission v. Gourley was the cause of
all the problems in this area of the law and the decision in this case
established an entirely new principle. In assessing damages for loss
of taxable income, if the lump sum is not taxable in the hands of the
plaintiff then the award should take into account the tax that the
plaintiff would have had to pay had he received the income in the
ordinary course of events. This decision has been the subject of much
comment, some favourable, but most critical.12 It has been applied in
England in many cases since 1956, and the scope of its application has
been extended to cover many situations other than personal injury
cases.
The rule in Gourley has been applied in cases of damages for
wrongful dismissal;13 in a libel case;14 and to a claim for loss of profit
due to an expropriation under a statute; 15 among others. 16 In Hall
& Co. Ltd. v. Pearlberg,17 it was held that damages for lost rent which
would be taxable in the plaintiff's hands as profits, ought not to be
diminished on the Gourley principle. A similar result was reached in
Diamond v. Campbell-Jones,5 where the lost profit was due to a
breach of a contract to sell a leasehold interest. Generally, in situations
where there are damages for lost profit due to breaches of commercial
contracts (other than for employment), since the damages must be
included as profits for tax purposes, the full amount is awarded to
the plaintiff. 19
10 See Biflingham v. Hughes, [19491 1 K.B. 643; [19491 1 All E.R. 684.
11 Fine v. Toronto Transportation Commission, [1945] O.W.N. 901,
(personal injuries). Bowers v. J. Hollinger & Co. Ltd., [1946] O.R. 526; [1946]
4 D.L.R. 186, (personal injuries). Anderson v. International Waxes Ltd., [19511
O.W.N. 113, (loss of profit due to breach of contract for sale of goods).
12 See KEmP AND KEmp, op. cit., ch. 3; Vineberg, P. F., 34 CAN. BAR REv.
940; Jolowicz J.A., DAMAGES AND Iwcom TAx, [19591 CAma, L.J. 86; Stewart,
LAw SocETY OF UPPER CANADA, SPECIAL LECTURES, 1958, Part I, 120; Fyfe,
ibid. p. 7-all of which criticize Gourley. Baxter, 19 MOD. L.R. 365
(accountant's viewpoint); For a note supporting the principle see Tucker,
[1959] CA_ m. L.J. 185.
13 Beach v. Reed Corrugated Cases Ltd., [1956] 1 W.L.R. 807; Phipps v.
Orthodox Unit Trusts Ltd. [1958] 1 Q.B. 314; [1957] 3 All E.R. 305; Parsons
v. B.N.W. Laboratories Ltd., [19631 2 All E.R. 658. In the last case Sellers, L.J.,
has a very persuasive dissent at p. 660. He wishes to restrict Gourley to tort
cases only.
14 Lewis 'v. Daily Telegraph, [1964] A.C. 234.
15 West Suffo lk County Council v. W. Rought Ltd., [19571 A.C. 403.
16 See also: Northern Ireland- Morahan v. Archer and Belfast Corpora-
tion, [19571 N.I. 61. Scotland- Spencer v. McMillan's Trustees, [19581 S.C. 300.
England- Thomas McGhie & Sons, Ltd. v. British Transportation Commis-
sion, [1963] 1 Q.B. 125; [1962] 2 All E.R. 646.
17 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 244.
18 [1961] Ch. 22; [1960] 1 All E.R. 583.
19 However, an attempt was made by Lord Hunter in Stewart v. Glen-
taggart Ltd., [1963] S.L.T. 119, to extend the rule in Gourley to cover even
cases where the award of damages was to be subject to tax. As elaborated
by the appellant in Parsons v. B.N.W. Laboratories Ltd., [1963] 2 All E.R. 658,
[Footnote continued on next page]
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In other common law countries the Gourley decision has been
for the most part unfavourably received although it was followed in
a personal injury case in New Zealand.20 As yet the Gourley principle
has not been applied in Australia and has received no support in
the U.S.21
The Gourley decision has been given a varied reception by Cana-
dian Courts. It has been applied, without comment, in personal injury
cases by courts in Newfoundland 22 and Saskatchewan.23 The Alberta
Court of Appeal mentioned that tax liability should be considered in
assessing damages for loss of earnings caused by breach of a contract
to sell shares in a business.24 In two recent cases in British Columbia,25
the court, although agreeing with the decision in Gourley, felt it could
not apply the principle in the personal injury cases before it, since in
this argument sets up an equation in which tax is taken into account on both
sides. First, damages are assessed on the basis of net income after taxes and
then, if the award is taxable, a sum must be added to it so that the plaintiff
eventually will receive the correct sum after the tax on his damages has been
met. This was a completely unanticipated and unjustified extension of the
Gourley case (which was decided specifically on the basis that the award was
not taxable) and was rejected by the Court of Appeal in the Parsons case.
It is interesting to note that, although in the Parsons case this approach
would have been to the defendant's advantage, generally, where the award
is subject to tax, an assessment on the above basis would be to the plaintiff's
benefit because of our progressive taxation. This can easily be shown:
Let t represent the average rate of tax on the income if earned annually.
Let t2 represent the average rate of tax on the lump sum award.
Let a, represent the discounting factor.
Let X represent the annual income before taxes.
Therefore (1- t) X would be the annual income after taxes and (1-
t,) X a, would be the net lump sum award that the plaintiff should
receive on the above basis.
For the plaintiff to receive this the award of damages would have to be
(l- t)
- X a,-l since the award would be taxed at the rate of t.
(1- t2)
On the strict Gourle basis where the award is taxable the damages would be
X aq and the plaintiff's net receipts after paying taxes would be (1 - t..) X a,
Thus, in the first case the plaintiff is left with (1- t,) X a, whereas when
the assessment itself isn't concerned with income tax liability he receives
(1- t2) X aq. Since t1 - t2 and o< - t1 - 1
Therefore (1-t) X a,, > (1-tO X aq.
That is with the former approach (that rejected in the Parsons case) the plain-
tiff is left with a larger net award (or at least as great where t, equals t.).
20 Smith v. Wellington Manufacturing Co., [1956) N.Z.L.R. 491.
21 Under American federal law damages for loss of earnings in personal
injury cases are exempted from tax by the Internal Revenue Code 1954, S. 104
(a) (2), and the award itself cannot be diminished because of income tax con-
siderations. See Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 113 N.E. 2d 366 (1953).
22 Power v. Stoyles, (1959) 17 D.L.R. (2d) 239.
23 Smith, v. C.P.R. Co., (1963) 45 W.W.R. 170; (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 249.
24 Widrig v. Strazer, (1963) 41 W.W.R. 257; 37 D.L.R. (2d) 629, decision
of Alberta C.A. reversed by Supreme Court of Canada, [1964] S.C.R. 376;
(1964) 47 W.W.R. 268; 44 D.L.R. (2d) 1, but without particular reference to
the income tax problem.
25 Buck v. Rostill, (1965) 51 W.W.R. 319. Curbello v. Thompson, (1966)
58 D.L.R. (2d) 48.
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Canada the damages award might be taxable. The Ontario courts
have applied Gourley in cases of breach of contract of employment.
26
These cases present a prime example of some of the undesirable
consequences of the British approach. The employer is actually better
off financially by breaching the contract than he is by performing.
The only decision prior to the Jennings case which rejected the
Gourley approach in principle was the judgment of Nitikman, J. of
the Manitoba Queens Bench in Soltys and Soltys v. Middup Moving
& Storage Ltd.
27
Comparison of the Approaches
The Jennings decision is most satisfactory in respect of its treat-
ment of the tax issue and the rejection of the rule in Gourley's case.
The divergence may be explained, in part, by an apparent tendency
of the British courts to be overly receptive to an appeal from the
defendant to be spared from ruin, and the Canadian and American
courts' sympathy for the plight of the plaintiff. More important than
this, however, is the fact that the rule in Jennings' case has a superior
theoretical foundation, leads to more equitable results and, adminis-
tratively, is more feasible. The question of whether the result in
Gourley was satisfactory was referred to the Law Reform Committee
in England.28 The majority of the members (nine) agreed with the
result in Gourley; three members thought the law should be as before
Gourley's case; and three members felt the law should be as before
Gourley except that the damages should be taxable in the plaintiff's
hands.
Those who subscribe to the last opinion maintain that the damages
represent income in the hands of the recipient and base their reasoning
on a general principle of revenue law that damages retain the charac-
teristics of the assets they replace.29 Damages for loss of profit are
taxable, but damages for loss of capital will be no more taxable than
would the capital asset which the plaintiff has lost.30 The damages are
income because, according to this viewpoint, they are replacing, not
the earning capacity (the capital asset), but the future earnings
themselves. From a purely fiscal point of view this approach might
be the fairest since the Crown gets its portion and yet the plaintiff's
financial position has not really suffered. Since the lump sum would be
taxable, then, according to the reasoning in Gourley, taxes could not
be considered in assessing damages. The effect would be that the
Crown is reshifting the benefit of the tax back from the defendant
to itself. This approach is still open in Britain and awaits a decision
in a case involving revenue authorities. It may well be the solution
26 Gourley was applied in Walker v. Copp Clark Publishing Co., [1962J
O.R. 622; 33 D.L.R. (2d) 338. In Poslums v. Toronto Stock Exchange and
Gardiner, [1964J 2 O.R. 547; 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210, Gale, J., as he then was,
indicated that had damages been awarded, he would have made a deduction
for tax in the assessment.
27 (1963) 44 W.W.R. 522; (1964) 41 D.L.R. (2d) 576.
28 Supra, footnote 7.
29 Burma Steamship Co. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1931] S.C. 156.
30 Ibid. at p. 159.
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to many of the problems caused by the Gourley case. Of course, the
new problem of selecting the proper basis on which to assess this tax
would then arise. To tax the entire lump sum as income earned in the
year received, at the going rates, would be grossly unfair. Some type
of spreading mechanism would have to be worked out.31 In Canada,
whether a court, in a binding decision, ultimately decides that damages
for loss of future earnings in personal injury cases are taxable or not
is irrelevant to the assessment of these damages. It is purely of interest
in tax law because the Supreme Court held that in no case would tax
liability reduce the assessment.
Even if we accept the award as not taxable, as the House of Lords
did in Gourley, the Canadian decision is superior. The basic principle
for the measure of damages, in tort as well as in contract, is that there
should be restitutio in integrum, i.e. "that sum of money which will
put the party who has been injured or who has suffered, in the same
position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong for
which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. ' 32
The maxim was employed in Billingham v. Hughes in refusing to
deduct tax, but in Gourley it was interpreted to provide a basis for the
new rule. Earl Jowitt, who delivered the leading judgment, said: 33
. ..for what damages is he liable? and if we apply the dominant rule,
we should answer: 'He is liable for such damages as by reason of his
wrongdoing, the plaintiff has sustained' . . . to ignore the tax element
at the present day would be to act in a manner out of touch with reality.
Nor can I regard the tax element as so remote that it should be dis-
regarded in assessing damages. The obligation to pay tax... is almost
universal in its application . . .no sensible person any longer regards
the net earnings from his trade or profession as the equivalent of his
available income .... I see no reason why in this case we should depart
from the rule or why respondent should not have his damages assessed
upon the basis of what he has really lost, and I consider that in determin-
ing what he has really lost the judge ought to have considered the tax
liability of the respondent.
Thus, in restoring the plaintiff's position and evaluating the
lost capital asset, the court finds that tax is a relevant factor. There
are two major criticisms of this analysis both of which are corrected
by the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada.
First, the idea that taxes are not too remote and, therefore, should
be considered, is a novel and unjustified use of the concept of remote-
ness. This concept, as applied in tort and breach of contract cases, is
only used to test whether the damages claimed flowed immediately
and necessarily from the injury.
31 But see Supra, footnote 19, where a model is used to show a possible
approach when the award of damages is taxable in the plaintiffs hands. If
the Crown in Britain were to decide to tax damage awards for loss of earnings
in personal injury cases, it may be possible to resort to the reasoning sub-
mitted by the appellant in the Parsons dase supra. Although the defendant
would then be paying higher damages, the result for the plaintiff would be, in
effect, a spreading mechanism for the tax, since he would be left with the
present value of his future yearly income after taxes.
32 Per Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v. Raujards Coal Co., (1880) 5 A.C.
25, 29. See also McNeiZ v. Fingard, [1945] O.R. 396 (Ont. C.A.).
33 Supra, footnote 2 at 202, 203.
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Secondly, the court in Gourley created what one commentator has
termed a "miracle of alchemy."34 That is, for the purposes of tax law,
the damages are capital awarded in respect of a capital loss (and
therefore not taxable); but, for the purposes of assessing damages
his loss is income, for how else does his liability for income tax become
relevant? This has been answered by the submission that although
the award is capital, in valuing that asset the basis should be income,
and for this purpose tax can be considered.3 5 The error in this argu-
ment (and in the non-remoteness argument) is in considering income
tax an element of the cost of earning income. As has been mentioned
above36 Judson, J., in Jennings case realizes that income tax is not a
cost but a compulsory disposition of income. It is a disbursement of the
funds after they have been earned, an incident of earning income and
not an expense incurred to earn it. No matter how certain the disburse-
ment may be the court is not justified in reducing the value of the
capital asset because of it.
There is another unsatisfactory result of Gourley which Judson,
J. highlights. It is the defendant who is getting the benefit from the
Crown not taxing the damages. If the plaintiff had earned the income
he would have paid taxes to the Crown, but if Gourley is applied the
plaintiff is now paying those taxes to the defendant and, often in
modern litigation, that means to a wealthy insurance company. It is
inconceivable that the Crown should wish to subsidize in this way
the sole person who is responsible for the damage-he who is the
author of the tragedy. As Lord Keith said in Blackwood v. Andre,
37
Further the argument seems to ignore the fact that the only person who
is going to benefit is the person who is liable in damages. There is no
suggestion that he will account to the Revenue for the capitalized income
tax which ex kypothesl has been taken into account in assessing the
damages.
A Hypothetical Situation
As persuasive as these theoretical arguments may be, it is in the
actual practical application that the superiority of the Jennings
principle is really demonstrated. This can be best illustrated by an
example. Let us begin with a very simple hypothetical situation which
we will gradually complicate.
P, our plaintiff, is permanently disabled in an accident caused by
the defendant's negligence and he can never work again. At the time
of the accident he was fifty years old, earning $10,000.00 per year, in
good health, married to a thirty-year old woman and had no children.
He had no income other than his salary and his wife had no income.
His net income after taxes based on present rates would be $8,408.00.3
8
Let us assume he had fifteen more working years and that while he
34 Jolowicz, [1959] CAMB. L.J. 86.
35 Tucker, [1959] CAum. L.J. 185.
36 Supra, footnote 6, at 656.
37 [1947] S.C. 333.
38 Income Tax Act R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 32 (as amended to 1966, C.C.H.
Canadian Ltd.).
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cannot work any longer, his life expectancy has not been reduced.3 9
If the courts were to apply the principle of restitutio in integrum
strictly, the lump sum damages awarded for loss of future earnings
should be sufficient to buy P an annuity to last either as long as he
lives or fifteen years, whichever is less.40 On the basis of the Gourley
case, the annuity should provide P with a sum equal to his after-tax
income annually. However, when he receives that annuity he will have
to pay tax on the interest portion of each payment 41 and, therefore,
will be left with a sum less than his after-tax earnings. Thus the
award should be increased to provide an annuity which will equal,
after tax has been paid on it, his original after-tax income. Therefore,
in applying Gourley, a court should have to set off against the taxes
reducing the award, any taxes which P might have to pay from the
disposition of his lump sum. This problem has not been considered
in the courts and in practice they do not determine the award on such
an actuarially precise basis, but if they do not, why should the court
suddenly become precision and dollar-conscious with respect to one
element-income taxes?
In computing the tax to be deducted, what rate should be used?
Lord Goddard said42 the present rate should be used, but this might
be unfair in Canada where the rates have a habit of fluctuating from
year to year, and where the provinces also impose income tax, so that
by moving from Ontario to Quebec P would have been subject to
different rates.
Now, let us complicate the problem. If P has dependent children
they increase his exempt income, but can be included only as long as
they remain dependents. However, if he has none what is the likeli-
hood of his having children? His wife is young. Is this not a factor
which should be considered?
What if P has substantial investment income? This leads to a
multitude of problems. If the taxes deducted are computed at the
marginal rate based on his total income, then the damages awarded
will be greatly reduced. This was exactly the situation in Gourley
where the effect of the income tax liability on a plaintiff with a large
39 If his life expectancy had been shortened, the position apparently is
that the award would be based on his years now remaining and not on his
life expectancy prior to the accident. See Oliver v. Ashman, [1962] 2 Q.B. 210;
Wise v. Kay, [1962] 1 Q.B. 638. In Canada, although the damages in Jennings
were computed on the basis of the shortened life expectancy, the issue has
not been decided by the Supreme Court. The point was not argued in the
Jennings case before the Supreme Court, however Cartwright, J., at 653,
654 indicates that he does not express agreement with this approach and
leaves it open to future litigation. For a criticism of the present position see
Fleming, The Lost Years, 50 CAL. L. REV. 598.
40 This would be provided by a 15 year temporary immediate life annuity
(12)
which expressed in actuarial symbols for a 50 year old plaintiff is a 50. . 15].
To provide $8,408 per year, payable in a monthly basis (as his income was
probably payable), based on Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. A66 Manual, a
sum of $81,290 would be necessary.
41 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148 (as amended to 1966-C.C.H.
Canadian Limited) ss. 6(1) (aa), 7(5), 11(1) (k).
42 Supra, footnote 2, at 209.
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fixed investment income was to reduce the award of damages from
£37,720 to £6,695. Further, what is the probability that this investment
income will remain at the present level? The court must consider
the different possibilities here. It is very likely that a man in this
position will obtain legal and accounting advice to minimize his tax
liability by means of tax planning schemes, or reduce his investment
income through gift programs.
What if P were from France? Would the court not have to
inquire into French tax law,43 and how would this affect the application
of the rule in Gourley's case?
If the court must consider all these matters then evidence must
be adduced pertaining to the plaintiff's financial situation and the
relevant tax law. This leads to problems of onus of proof. Kelly, J.A.
in the Ontario Court of Appeal4  put the burden on the defendant,
whereas English cases have put the burden on the plaintiff to present
such evidence.4 5 The court will have to decide if the lump sum will be
taxable or not, and also, if the lost income was taxable income, before
Gourley can be applied. The civil courts will be turned into bodies of
fiscal inquiry. There will be discovery on tax matters and the plaintiff
may be required to disclose confidential tax and financial information.
Certainly, this intrusion is undesirably oppressive to a plaintiff who
has been wronged already. Can it be said that the result of applying
the rule in Gourley is so logically and equitably satisfying that it
justifies the extra cost, time and complexity of litigation?
All these problems and difficulties inherent in the House of Lords
approach disappear in Canada following the Jennings case. P's
damages would be assessed on the basis of his loss of $10,000.00 per
annum (taking into account the proper contingencies) and that is
that. No consideration is necessary of all the other extraneous matters
required by the Gourley case. Of course, if the Department of Revenue
wishes to tax P on the proceeds, then that is a matter between them,
and does not affect the damages which the defendant must pay to the
plaintiff.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Canada, in the Jennings case, has given
substantial cause for greater confidence in the maturity and in-
dependence of the Canadian judiciary.46 It has rejected an unhappy
position of the House of Lords in favour of a common sense and legally
sound approach. After ten years, Canadian lawyers are finally able
to advise their clients confidently with respect to the effect of income
tax on damage awards.
RONALD APPLEBY.*
43 See Pract (JuZien) et aZ, SIA v. H. G. PoZand Ltd., [19621 1 Lloyd's Rep.
566 (Belgian law involved).
44 Supra, footnote 5.
45 See HaU & Co. Ltd. v. PearZberg, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 244; West Suffo7k
County Coundil v. W. Rought Ltd., [1957] A.C. 403; Phipps vt. Orthodox Unit
Trusts Ltd., [1958] 1 Q.B. 314, [19571 3 All E.R. 305.
46 Supra, footnote 3.
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